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ABSTRACT
Sponsored search in E-commerce platforms such as Amazon, Taobao
and Tmall provides sellers an eective way to reach potential buy-
ers with most relevant purpose. In this paper, we study the auction
mechanism optimization problem in sponsored search on Alibaba’s
mobile E-commerce platform. Besides generating revenue, we are
supposed to maintain an ecient marketplace with plenty of quality
users, guarantee a reasonable return on investment (ROI) for ad-
vertisers, and meanwhile, facilitate a pleasant shopping experience
for the users. ese requirements essentially pose a constrained
optimization problem. Directly optimizing over auction parameters
yields a discontinuous, non-convex problem that denies eective
solutions. One of our major contribution is a practical convex opti-
mization formulation of the original problem. We devise a novel
re-parametrization of auction mechanism with discretized sets of
representative instances. To construct the optimization problem,
we build an auction simulation system which estimates the resulted
business indicators of the selected parameters by replaying the
auctions recorded from real online requests. We summarized the
experiments on real search tracs to analyze the eects of delity
of auction simulation, the ecacy under various constraint targets
and the inuence of regularization. e experiment results show
that with proper entropy regularization, we are able to maximize
revenue while constraining other business indicators within given
ranges.
1 INTRODUCTION
In this article, we present our work on auction mechanism opti-
mization in the mobile sponsored search engine of Alibaba’s mobile
E-commerce platform (Taobao.com and Tmall.com). In 2017, the plat-
form powered millions of active advertisers to proactively reach
hundreds of millions of unique potential buyers and eectively
accomplish sales of goods worthy of hundreds of billions of RMB.
Sponsored search has been proved to be one of the most success-
ful business model in online digital advertising. For each user query,
the sponsored search engine renders relevant advertisements in
addition to the main search results. e advertisers bid on query
keywords for their advertisements. For each advertisement showing
opportunity (an impression), the sponsored search engine selects a
set of advertisement candidates relevant to the search query, pre-
dicts their quality scores such as the click-through-rate (CTR) and
conversion-rate (CVR), allocates impression opportunities to adver-
tisements using an auction mechanism and computes the clearing
price for advertisers.
Generalized second price (GSP) mechanism is arguably the most
widely used mechanism for the sponsored search engines [5, 7, 14],
which ranks the advertisements by their bidding price and quality
score. e top ranked advertisements get the impressions and pay
the minimum price to maintain their ranking locations.
In the literature, most of the auction mechanisms focus on max-
imizing the expected revenue in the Bayesian seing [11], with
variants on balancing eciency and revenue using reserve prices
[4, 12], or trading-o relevance and eciency with an exponen-
tial weight of quality score[10]. However, in the realistic case of
E-commerce, the auction mechanism should be optimized under
many constraints including the advertisers’ budget, advertisement
eciency limits, etc. To make the platform revenue sustainable
for long-term gain, we should also take care of the factors like
advertisers’ return on investment (ROI, quantitatively measured as
the sale amount from the advertising cost) and users’ satisfactory
of the search experience.
Moreover, most of the existing auction mechanisms only work
under very ideal environments, where the participants are perfectly
rational [13] and the click-through-rate of advertisements are xed
according to the ad positions. However, these assumptions are not
true in industry search engines and the trac characteristics like
user propensity, search queries changes dynamically over the days.
In Alibaba’s mobile sponsored search platform, we conduct GSP
auction in a virtual space (the ranking score). Hence, the key to
improve the performance of our platform is to nd the right ranking
score function. As mentioned above, our target is to maximize
the revenue of the platform while meeting the requirements like
user experience and advertisers’ ROI. It is natural to formulate
the auction optimization problem as a constrained optimization
problem.
However, since the ranking function space is too large, it is im-
practical to explore the performance of all the ranking functions
online. To approximately gauge the outcome performance indica-
tors of dierent ranking functions, we build a simulation system
to replay the online auctions to generate virtual impressions and
estimate expected user responses under a given ranking function.
To make the optimization problem practical, we introduce a dis-
crete set of selected ranking functions as a novel representation
of the auction mechanism. We re-parameterize the auction mech-
anism as the hiing probability of elements in the set. For each
impression, one of the ranking functions is selected according to
their probability to rank and price the candidate advertisements.
e constrained optimization problem is to nd the best hiing
probability of the given set of ranking functions. With this rep-
resentation, we derive a convex optimization formulation of the
problem.
2 PROBLEM AND FORMULATION
e auction process in E-commerce sponsored search platform can
be formulated as follows: for each product search request with user
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query q, the search engine nds a set of advertisement candidates
Ad relevant to q via broad match[8] and estimate predicted CTR
ρa , CVR ρ ′a of each candidate using statistical models. en the
predicted CTR, CVR and bidding price baq of the ad on the query
keyword are mapped into a virtual space by evaluating a ranking
score, and a GSP auction is conducted on the virtual space.
e ranking score, as the core of auctions in our platform, ac-
counts for both expected eciency[10] and hidden cost[1]. It is
principally dened as
ϑ (ρa ,baq , ρ ′a ) = Fθe (ρa ) ∗ baq︸           ︷︷           ︸
expected eciency
+ ~θc (ρa , ρ ′a )︸         ︷︷         ︸
hidden cost term
(1)
where θe and θc are vectors of detailed parameters in the scoring
functions. For simplicity, we denote the combined parameters as
θ . As a GSP auction in the space of the ranking score, the price for
the i-th bidder in the ranking is determined as the inmum of bid
that she can still keep her position
minb, s.t. ϑ (ρia ,b, ρ ′ia ) ≥ ϑ (ρi+1a ,bi+1aq , ρ ′i+1a ) (2)
Each component in θ weighs dierent input aributes of the
function and inuence the outcomes of ranking and pricing in the
auctions dierently, for example favoring higher bidding price or
higher click probability. Due to business issues, we omit the detailed
formulation of the components in (1). is exclusion will not hinder
the illustration of our methods though, since the method can be
applied to various formulation of the ranking score function.
In practice, a context-aware mechanism which assigns dierent
mechanisms on dierent trac is usually used to beer capture the
distinct properties of search requests and ad candidate sets. In our
case, search requests are designated into categories C using query
information. Each category c has a manually tuned parameter θ˜c
that eectively conducts the auctions.
For sustainable development of the platform, we should keep im-
proving the satisfactory of users and advertisers while generating
revenue for the platform. In our work, we regard the satisfactory
of users as their engagement with the platform, i.e. the advertise-
ment clicks and product purchases they make. For advertisers, we
measure average cost for each user engagement through the adver-
tisement as indicators of advertiser’s ROI. We also take advertising
PV coverage ratio (ratio of ad impressions to total ad slots) as an im-
portant factor of users’ search experience, as excessively displaying
ads among search result is typically displeasing.
Dierent ranking function parameter θs have dierent outcomes
of ranking and pricing, which lead to dierent user responses and
eventually dierence business metrics. We dene business per-
formance indicators of θ accordingly, including platform revenue,
overall click-through rate (CTR), conversion rate (CVR) and ad PV
coverage ratio (PVR), and advertisers’ fulllment of goal as cost
per-click (CPC) and cost per-conversion/acquisition (CPA).
2.1 Constrained Mechanism Optimization
One may see this setup as a multi-objective optimization problem
as proposed in [9]. However, the objectives are indirectly and
nonlinearly correlated and appropriately seing the preferences
among each objective to meet a particular set of requirements is
dicult.
Instead, complying with the general business objective, we for-
mulate our business problem into a constrained optimization setup,
which optimizes over auction parameters θ1 · · · θ |C | for each cate-
gory c . In detail, the goal is to nd the best parameters of which the
outcome of auctions maximizes the total revenue of the platform,
while being feasible for the constraints on the metrics of CTR, PPC,
CVR, CPA and PVR, etc. We denote targets of lower bounds of CTR
and CVR, lower and upper bounds of CPC, CPA and PVR as ρ, ρ ′,
pi , pi , pi ′, pi ′, κ and κ, respectively.
Directly solving the optimization problem is intractable since we
are working on the second price auction mechanism, the outcomes
are typically non-convex and even discontinuous with respect to
the parameters θ . It is fascinating and challenging to formulate
the optimization problem into a sophisticated framework, such as
convex optimization [3].
In this article, we present a novel re-parametrization of ranking
score function using a set of representative parameter instances to
make the optimization problem practical. e instances in the set
are selected by evenly discretizing each dimension of the parameter
within a bounded-box centering at parameter θ˜c of the original
ranking function. In our experiments, the number of selected xed
parameter vectors K , as is the number of grids in the bounded-box,
is 2025.
is set of parameters {θc, j , j ∈ 1 · · ·K} for each request cate-
gories c ∈ C provides a comprehensive range of dierent outcomes
of auctions around that of the original θ˜c ’s. By weighing the ele-
ments in the set, we are able to tune it to produce specic results.
To steer the outcome of the family of ranking score functions,
we asign a probability of selecting the instance θc, j for category c ,
denoted as xc, j . In application, the process of applying this family
of mechanisms in sponsored search auction is described in Algo-
rithm1. e re-parametrization with xc,∗ makes the constrained
optimization problem practical.
We articulate the method of obtaining the best distribution xc, j
over θc, j conforming to the business requirements. For each request
qi of category c , the ranking function with parameter θc, j produces
the corresponding ranking and pricing result, of which we denote
the expected user response of click and purchase as ρi, j and ρ ′i, j
and the price of click as pii, j . With all the auction outcomes of each
request with all the ranking function instances, our problem is to
nd the particular probability values xc, j for each category and each
ranking function of the category that maximizes expected revenue
and meets the business requirements in expectation. Formally, the
constrained optimization problem is materialized as:
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Algorithm 1: Apply auction mechanism online
Input: x ,Θ
Output: A list of auction-winning ads.
1 foreach search request q do
2 Determine the category c of the request q;
3 Sample a parameter conguration
j ∼ Multinoull i(xc,1, · · · , xc,K );
4 Assign the parameters θ ← Θc, j ;
5 foreach Ad candidate in parallel do
6 Estimate the click and conversion probability ρˆ and ρˆ ′
Evaluate the ranking score ϑθ (ρˆ,baq , ρˆ ′);
7 end
8 Sort and lter Ad candidates by the ranking score;
9 Calculate click price for top Nslot ads in the sorted set;
10 Response with the result ad list;
11 end
arg min
x
− Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, jpii, j (3)
s.t. Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, j ≥ ρ (4)
pi ≤ Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, jpii, j
Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, j ≤ pi (5)
κ ≤ Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jI{adi exists}
Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, j1 ≤ κ (6)
Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, jρ ′i, j
Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, j ≥ ρ
′ (7)
pi ′ ≤ Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, jpii, j
Σc ΣiΣjI{qi ∈ c}xc, jρi, jρ ′i, j
≤ pi ′ (8)
K∑
j=1
xc, j = 1, ∀c ∈ C (9)
xc, j ≥ 0, ∀c ∈ C,∀j ∈ 1, · · · ,K (10)
where I{x} = 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise.
In this way, we simplify the complex continuous parameter op-
timization problem into a discrete K-armed bandits optimization
problem. To construct this setup, we estimate the resulted business
indicators just at selected discreteθc, j instead of every possible in-
stance of θ . When focusing on the xed set of rules, we are able
to improve the accuracy of the estimations. Also, compared with a
solution of one single ranking function, a distribution of the xed
instances has a spectrum of much ner-grained outcome, since it
is essentially a linear combination of the outcomes of the ranking
functions in the set. Also, when applied online in the stochas-
tic environment, a distribution of multiple instances works more
smoothly and robustly than a xed one.
3 IMPLEMENTATION
e key problem in constructing the problem setup in Eq.(3)…(10) is
to evaluate the coecients which are determined by the auction out-
come and stochastic user responses. Applying θc, j directly online to
real tracs in short periods will merely result in observations with
high variance, yet applying in longer period is unaordable since
it would seriously damage the performance of the platform when
applying θ that ercely violates the business constraints. We carry
out a biased but smooth estimation via oine replay simulation.
Aer estimating all the business indicators and set up the co-
ecients in Eq.(3)…(10), it is fairly straightforward to solve the
problem using augmented Lagrangian method [2]. Also, an entropy
regularization term is added to the optimization goal in Eq.(3) to
make the results robust to the error in the performance indicator
computation by oine auction simulation.
3.1 Oline Replay Simulation
In this work, we approximate the auction outcomes under dierent
mechanism parameters by replaying the recorded online auctions
using the parameters. Compared with applying to real online trac,
the oine replay simulation is safe since it has no eect on online
user experience and advertiser’s ROI. More importantly, we are
able to apply various ranking and pricing rules to the exactly same
set of requests and ad candidates. Whereas online evaluation of
rules are based on spliing of real tracs and so on dierent set of
requests, which brings variance.
Replay logs consist of the request context, the query and the user
prole, and the whole set of ads’ information in auction including
predicted CTR, CVR and bidding price. Under the hood, the ad
serving module records each of the ad request and the algorithmic
module records the CTR and CVR predictions for the request as
well as bidding information of each ad candidate. e recorded data
are then collected by ETL infrastructures, aggregated and joined
by the request id and eventually stored on Alibaba cloud, where
we implement the oine simulation pipeline. e raw log data
is organized as a table partitioned by hours, which amounts to
hundreds of TBs each day.
Based on the replay log data, we are capable to apply any ranking
and pricing function θ to a snapshot of the online trac and obtain
a set of winning ads for each ad slot. By implementing the ranking
and ltering logics according to the counterparts in the online ad
serving module, we make the oine simulation of the auctions
produce the same ranking and pricing results as online’s.
With outcomes of simulated ranking and pricing, we estimate
the expected user response to further estimate the business indica-
tor metrics. We utilize the CTR and CVR predictions ρˆ and ρˆ ′ to
approximate the expectation of user click and conversion.
However, due to systematic bias caused by simplifying assump-
tions and variations in data distributions between training and
serving time, the empirical mean of the predicted and the actual
CTRs diverge, especially when the position eect of the ad slot
escalates. is divergence brings bias to our estimations of metrics.
We remedy this bias by statistically calibrating the predicted CTRs
[6] during replay simulation and evaluation of metrics, so that their
empirical mean matches the actual CTR.
We learn calibration mappings ϱp (ρˆ) for each advertisement slot
positionp using isotonic regression[16]. ϱp (ρˆ) is modeled as a piece-
wise constant function, monotonically increasing with ρˆ, which
is a exible approximator. e range of the input value ρˆ is split
into B intervals. For each interval τ , within which the number of
ad impressions is στ and the actual CTR of these impressions is ρˇτ ,
3
Figure 1: Calibration results of two ad slots.
we learn a constant factor ωτ as the calibrated ctr corresponding
to the interval of predicted CTR. e calibration learning task is
formulated as:
arg min
ω
B∑
τ=1
στ |ωτ − ρˇτ |2 (11)
subject to ωi ≤ ωj if i ≤ j, ∀i, j ∈ 1, · · · ,B (12)
We setup and solve the above learning task for each ad slot
position. We prepare samples for calibration by aggregating adver-
tisement serving logs. For each ad impression i of slot position p,
we extract the online predicted CTR ρˆi , and label it is clicked or
not. en we aggregate the impression data by grouping by the
interval bin τ , and estimate the actual CTRs ρˇτ of samples that fall
in each interval bin.
Figure 1 shows that calibration corrects the over-optimistically
predicted CTRs and remediates the position bias in our platform.
With calibrated user response expectations, we calculate the
business indicators on the whole dataset for each mechanism pa-
rameter θc, j in Eq.(3)…(10). With these steps, the construction of
the problem setup is nished.
3.2 Regularization with Entropy Bonus
Solving the linear programming problem is fairly straightforward
using sophisticated solutions to obtain a globally convergent solu-
tion. However, as it is a data-driven approach, the coecients in
the problem setup are approximated and the data distribution may
also vary day aer day. e optimal combination of mechanism
parameters found from the simulated data is likely to be suboptimal.
To remedy this problem, we introduce some additional prior
information via regularization to prevent overing to the replay
simulated data. In our case, we borrow the idea of entropy regular-
ization (entropy bonus) from reinforcement learning research [15],
where entropy bonus was introduced to prevent convergence to a
single choice of action and enforce exploration.
We add this regularization term weighted by a hyper-parameter
ν to the objective:
L(x) =
∑
c
∑
j
xc, j (−
∑
i
I{qi ∈ c}ρi, jpii, j + νxc, j lnxc, j ) (13)
With the objective Eq.(13) and constraints Eq.(4)…(10), the prob-
lem setup is a linearly constrained convex optimization. Among
many available methods, we use augmented Lagrangian for its
simplicity.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the experiments to measure the ecacy
of the proposed method in auction mechanism optimization. We
designed and launched several rounds of experiments on a fraction
of the search trac on the mobile search engine of the E-commerce
platform. e baseline of the experiments is implemented the same
as the main product version of the ranking score function, which
consists of manually tuned parameters θ˜c for each of the several
thousands search categories. From the experimental results, we
studied the eects of various factors on the solution of the problem
and summarized the motivations, the arrangements, the results and
some analysis of our experiments.
For each experiment, we construct a particular setup of the
constrained problem. We evaluate the estimated business indicators
for all the xed parameters θc, j via auction replay simulation on
logged data from the past 14 days. In the same pipeline, we also
simulate the baseline mechanism to estimate the baseline metrics
of exactly the same requests. e constraint targets in the problem
setup Eq.(4)…(10) are set by scaling up and down the estimated
baseline business indicators from simulation for the upper and
lower bound targets of the constraints.
We solve the constrained optimization using augmented La-
grangian method, in which the dual variables generally indicates
the diculty of satisfying each constraint. With some particu-
lar constraint targets, the residual of the constraint term may be
large, making the solution infeasible. is is expected since the
targets may be beyond the domain in which spans the outcome of
all combinations of the ranking functions from valid distributions.
We launched the implementation of Algorithm 1 with each par-
ticular solution x as well as the baseline onto online A/B test en-
vironment in our mobile search platform to handle 1% of the real
search tracs. Experiments are retained for at least 24 hours to
suciently gauge the business performance indicators.
4.1 Results and Analysis
e experiments and results conrms the eectiveness of our ap-
proach and analyzes the eects of miscellaneous factors to it in
optimizing auction mechanisms with constraints. Our approach
generally meets the business requirements specied in constraint
targets and maximizes the revenue.
4.1.1 Calibration in simulation. We check the eects of calibra-
tion in oine simulation by comparing the results of problem setup
with and without calibration. e experimental result shows that
calibration helps signicantly improve accuracy of the simulated
metrics estimation and produce online results that approximately
comply with the constraint targets, as illustrated in table 1.
Without calibration, the simulated results tend to be over-optimistic
on the overall user response, i.e CTR and CVR. is is because ads
with high predicted CTRs and CVRs, which may be over-estimated,
are more likely to win the auctions. us this experiment also
express the inuence of accuracy in estimations of the objective
and the constraint targets in the problem setup.
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Table 1: With and without calibration
problem setup congurations result metrics
∆CTR ∆PPC ∆PVR ∆CVR ∆CPA calib ∆REV ∆CTR ∆PPC ∆PVR ∆CVR ∆CPA
≥2.5% -2%∼0 -0.5%∼0.5% -1%∼1% -1%∼1% with +0.06% +2.31% -2.07% -0.13% -0.75% -1.33%without 1.09% +0.89% +0.48% -0.28% -0.92% +1.12%
4.1.2 Eicacy with various constraint targets. Most importantly,
we want to examine the eectiveness of the proposed method in
conforming with the specic requirements of the business perfor-
mance while maximizing revenue.
We specify dierent business requirements on the performance
by varying the upper and lower bounds in the constraints of the
problem setup. With the solutions of the various setups, we examine
how the resulted metrics correlate to the targets.
e various arrangement of targets and the corresponding on-
line experiment results are illustrated in table 2. e metrics in
the experiment results generally follow the designated constraint
targets, though miscue does exist due to the limit of the ranking
function and exceedingly selected target values.
For CVR and CPA, we use simpler constraint targets because
the expected number of conversions is less accurate, since it is
calculated based on expected number of clicks, which is also ap-
proximated.
4.1.3 Regularization. We evaluate the eects of the entropy reg-
ularization term in the objective of the optimization problem Eq.(13).
In the experiment, we choose one single set of constraint, of which
the targets are ∆CTR≥1.5%, -1%≤ ∆PPC≤0, -0.5%≤ ∆PVR≤0.5%,
∆CVR≥0 and ∆CPA≤0.
e experimental results are listed in table 3. To articulate the
eects of regularization, we also list the estimated business indi-
cators of applying the solution to the replay simulation dataset in
addition to the online experimental results.
Regularization term makes the oine simulated metrics subop-
timal, but, when set appropriately, it improves the robust of the
optimization result and performs beer in the online trac.
5 CONCLUSION
In this article, we present a constrained optimization formulation
of the auction mechanism optimization problem for E-commerce
sponsored search platform. We showed this formulation is practical
and applicable with discretized parameterization of the auction
mechanism. We illustrate the construct of the problem setup with
calibrated oine simulation and the objective with entropy regu-
larization to improve the robustness of the results.
From the experimental results, we can conclude that our pro-
posed methods do conform approximately with the specied con-
straint targets while maximizing the revenue. Another contribu-
tion of our work is the building of the auction simulation system
congured to accommodate our experiments. Moreover, it is also
extensible for other experiments that may require a replay of a large
number of online auctions. We also would like to comment that
it is obvious that our method would cause some bidding behavior
changes once enforced and the characteristic of online data distri-
bution will dri away from the snapshot of oine data. Whereas
this problem is resolved as models are updated in a daily basis while
most of the active campaigns on our platform last for days or even
weeks.
e eectiveness of the proposed method is crucially impacted
by two factors. One is the accuracy of the oine simulation in
estimating the business indicators. In the future work, we will
work on incorporating online evaluated performance indicators
into the problem setup to improve the accuracy. e other factor is
the x set of selected representative parameters θc, j . e outcome
of the auctions spans the space dened by the outcome of each
individual point in the set. A signicant boost in the business
performance requires judiciously selected candidates in the set and
even a new design of the ranking score function, which is also an
important future direction of this work.
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Table 2: Various constraint targets
constraint target congurations results
∆CTR ∆PPC ∆PVR ∆CVR ∆CPA ∆REV ∆CTR ∆PPC ∆PVR ∆CVR ∆CPA
≥1% -1%∼0 -0.5%∼0.5% ≥0 ≤0 +0.387% +1.37% -0.91% -0.06% +0.31% -1.22%
≥1.5% -1%∼0 -0.5%∼0.5% ≥0 ≤0 +0.378% +1.35% -0.89% -0.07% +0.33% -1.21%
≥1.5% -2%∼0 -0.5%∼0.5% ≥0 ≤0 +0.146% +1.69% -1.38% -0.14% +0.24% -1.62%
≥2% -2%∼0 -0.5%∼0.5% ≥0 ≤0 -0.074% +1.96% -1.72% -0.28% +0.11% -1.83%
≥2.5% -2%∼0 -0.5%∼0.5% ≥0 ≤0 -0.219% +2.28% -2.11% -0.34% -0.05% -2.06%
≥3% -2%∼0 -0.5%∼0.5% ≥0 ≤0 infeasible constraints
Table 3: Various regularization term
ν
simulated online
∆CTRs ∆PPCs ∆PVRs ∆REVs ∆CTRo ∆PPCo ∆PVRo ∆REVo
0 +2.62% -1.35% +0.74% +1.98% +0.78% -1.25% +0.16% -0.32%
1e-4 +1.78% -1.02% +0.34% +1.08% +1.31% -1.14% -0.11% +0.045%
1e-2 +1.53% -0.79% +0.11% +0.84% +1.35% -0.89% -0.07% +0.378%
1 +1.24% -0.65% -0.08% +0.501% +1.13% -0.73% -0.15% +0.241%
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